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ABSTRACT 
As privacy issues have gained social salience, entrepreneurs have begun to offer 
privacy enhancing technologies (PETs) and the U.S. has begun to enact privacy 
legislation.  But "privacy" is an ambiguous notion. In the liberal tradition, it is an 
individualistic value protecting citizens from intrusion into a realm of autonomy. A 
feminist critique suggests that the social utility of privacy is to exclude certain issues 
from the public realm. Sociologists suggest that privacy is about identity management, 
while political economists suggest that the most salient privacy issue is the use of 
personal information to normalize and rationalize populations according to the needs of 
capital.  While PETs have been developed for use by individual consumers, recently 
developers are focusing on the business to business market, where demand is stoked by 
the existence of new privacy regulations. These new laws tend to operationalize privacy 
in terms of "personally identifiable information." The new generation of PETs reflect and 
reify that definition. This, in turn, has implications for the everyday understandings of 
privacy and the constitution of identity and social life.  In particular, this socio-technical 
practice may strengthen the ability of data holders to rationalize populations and create 
self-serving social categories. At the same time, they may permit individuals to negotiate 
these categories outside of panoptic vision. They may also encourage public discussion 
and awareness of these created social categories.  
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TYPES OF PRIVACY 
“Privacy” is an ambiguous notion – different individuals and different social groups 
may entertain conflicting ideas of the utility of privacy and the danger of privacy 
invasion.   
In the liberal tradition, privacy is an individualistic value.  Privacy of this sort 
protects a sphere of autonomy in which the individual is free to be fully herself, and to 
enjoy intimate relations with others. It protects against intrusions both from the 
overbearing state and from the pressure of social norms.  This type of privacy protects 
against Peeping Toms, warrantless searches, and laws restricting intimate behavior.  It is 
perhaps characterized most aptly by Warren Brandeis, who defined privacy as the “right 
to be left alone” (Warren and Brandeis, 1890). 
Some feminists have suggested that this particular privacy ideal does not benefit all 
individuals equally.  Indeed, it is used in the construction of social inequality.  As an 
ideal, it helps to create a private, domestic sphere apart from the public realm. To this 
private sphere are relegated certain populations, particularly women, and certain issues, 
particularly those of sexuality.  The public/private distinction then serves as a tool of 
social silencing and repression.  From this perspective, the most important privacy issues 
are not those of freedom from intrusion into the domestic realm, but instead of the social 
construction of the public/private divide itself.  Feminist scholarship investigates the 
construction of that divide, and its implications for social power.  Identity politics, 
particularly the public claiming of stigmatized identities, is very much concerned with 
this political construction of private realms (Boling 1996).  
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Another strand of privacy theory is also related to the construction of  social 
identities.  Sociologists, especially Goffman (1959), have explored how individuals 
selectively employ revelation and concealment to facilitate social performances.  These 
performances create and maintain social identity as they re-inscribe social relations. 
Moreover, the performances are contextually specific.  Certain roles are assumed in 
relation to certain others in certain places and circumstances.  The ability to insist on a 
certain social performance is a measure of social power.  Therefore social power includes 
the ability to control the informational context of a relationship.  Waiters close the pantry 
door to withhold from the diners in the front stage knowledge of the workings of the 
kitchen (the back stage). Privacy – the ability to close the door - is implicated in this 
negotiation of social identities. This understanding of the use of privacy is perhaps best 
summed up in Westin’s definition of privacy as an individual’s right “to control, edit, 
mange, and delete information about them[selves] and decide when, how, and to what 
extent that information is communicated to others” (Westin 1967) 
During the 1960’s, new practices of computerized data collection re-enlivened 
privacy concerns.  Originally these concerns were phrased in terms of the liberal 
individualist model of privacy, where threats of Big Brother loomed.  Soon, however, 
some social theorists adopted Foucault’s model of the Panopticon to understand privacy 
and surveillance practice.  In this model, the focus is less on surveillance as it targets 
individuals, and more on surveillance as a technique of social organization which creates 
disciplines of knowledge, and normalizes and rationalizes populations in relation to those 
disciplines.  In its idealized form, panoptic surveillance individualizes each member of 
the population, and permits the observation and recording of each individual’s activities, 
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then collates these individual observations across the population. From these con-
glomerated observations, statistical norms are produced relating to any of a multitude of 
characteristics.  These norms are then applied back to the subjected individuals, who are 
categorized and perhaps acted upon, either with gratification or punishment, according to 
their relation to the produced norm.  Thus surveillance produces both discipline (that is, 
conformity to the norm), and the disciplines (regulated fields of knowledge and 
expertise). The entire system gains efficiency when each individual realizes the 
inevitability of disciplinary action and internalizes the discipline, making the action itself 
unnecessary (Foucault 1979) .  More recently, political economists have added that this 
process occurs overwhelmingly to serve the needs of capital, especially by normalizing 
and rationalizing consumer behavior in the marketplace (Gandy 1993b). This type of 
privacy theory addresses two major social issues.  The first is the use of demographic and 
other consumer generated information to structure the lived world by creating categories 
of ideal consumers, markets, products and places.  The second issue is the social 
discrimination inherent in the categorization and ranking of particular consumers by their 
potential value.  
These types of privacy concerns, which we may, for the sake of convenience, label 
“freedom from intrusion”, “public participation”, “identity management” and “social 
coordination”,  are obviously interrelated. They are not offered as mutually exclusive 
truth claims as to the meaning of privacy, but as a sort of compass rose to the 
philosophical, cultural, and ideological terrain of privacy discourse. 
Individuals and groups in different social positions may find that their interests in 
privacy vary in different contexts. For example, a gay man may attempt to make sexuality 
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a public issue while simultaneously keeping private the specifics of his sexual behavior.  
He may seek political recognition of a gay community while resisting the construction of 
that community as a market segment.  He may variously try to bring his sexuality to the 
fore, either as political fact or as erotic invitation, or suppress it as a matter of little 
moment. 
 
CONSUMER ORIENTED PETS AS MEDIATORS OF PRIVACY 
INTERESTS 
Some social actors have negotiated their privacy concerns through the use of privacy 
enhancing technologies (PETs).  These systems employ a number of different techniques 
and facilitate the protection of different types of privacy.  Until recently, most of these 
systems have been designed to be adopted by the individual end user, rather than 
incorporated into an institutional setting. 
Among the earliest PETs were cryptographic systems that protected communications 
between individuals from undesired eavesdropping. They ensured that messages sent to a 
particular individual could be read only by that individual.  Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) is 
a prime example of this type of system (Garfinkel, 1995).  These systems address the first 
type of privacy concern: freedom from intrusion.  
Anonymizers were designed to break the link between a user’s online interactions 
and the user herself.  They make it difficult or impossible to trace the origin of a message.  
One of the earliest of these systems was pennet.fi.  All e-mail to be anonymized went 
through a central server in Finland, which automatically stripped identifying information 
from the e-mail headers, and replaced it with more or less random identifiers.  All mail 
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seemed to originate at the anonymizing server, and only the server operator had access to 
the database that linked users’ information to their anonymized identifiers.  Other 
systems were established which performed similar operations on web traffic.  This type 
of system can be seen to mediate the first and second types of privacy concern.  They 
prevent intrusion since the physical space upon which to intrude remains unknown and so 
unreachable.  More importantly, though, they permit the user to maintain a public 
presence and engage in public interactions without fear of retribution.  By altering the 
established mechanisms of social silencing, these systems allow users to bring taboo 
topics into the light.  In that sense, they alter the means of constructing the public/private 
divide. 
Later, systems were developed whose aim was to control the unintentional flow of 
information from an individual to a corporate correspondent.  The design of standard 
browsers permits web sites to place “cookies” on a user’s machine and read those cookies 
during subsequent visits to the site.  Cookies are often used to uniquely identify an 
individual user’s machine.  The first time a machine is used to access a particular site, 
that site sets a unique id cookie on the machine, and also establishes a record indexed by 
that identifier in an on-site database.  Thereafter, whenever the machine is used to access 
the site, that site reads the unique identifier in the cookie, monitors the user’s behavior at 
the site, and updates the record accordingly.  In this way, the site operator (or, more 
often, third party profilers) create comprehensive profiles of each user’s web browsing 
habits.  PETs which interrupt this  process include pseudonymizers and cookie 
management software.   
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Cookie management software permits the user to obliterate cookies and other 
persistent identifiers and so establish a new digital identity with each browser session.  
This interferes with the ability to collect information across browser sessions, and to 
correlate that information into a single record to be used as an input to statistical 
processes.  It therefore is informed by the fourth privacy concern – panoptic social 
coordination.   
Pseudonymizers permit the user to establish a number of separate, but persistent, 
identifiers among which she may choose for her web interactions.  Each pseudonym (or 
simply “nym”) would have a separate “cookie jar” to which web sites could write and 
read.  Therefore, each nym would eventually be represented by separate, unlinkable, 
digital records.  Freedom®, from Zero Knowledge Systems, was, until its recent demise, 
the most technically sophisticated of pseudonymity suites (McFarlane et al, 2000).  In 
addition to acting as a pseudonymizer, it was also an effective anonymizer, in that it 
made it very difficult to establish linkages between a user and that user’s pseudonymous 
online presence. These types of systems are primarily informed by the third type of 
privacy - context and identity management. However, in addressing anonymity, they also 
address privacy through the frames of intrusion and participation. 
Another type of PET does not so much allow the user to establish different identities 
as it permits the user to negotiate the revelation of sets of data points of a single personae.  
These are infomediaries, like Lumeria or Privaseek.  With these, the user establishes a set 
of rules under which she is willing to divulge certain types of information about herself.  
If an information seeker signals that he is willing to abide by certain constraints (perhaps 
offering the user a discount, or promising to restrict third party access to the information) 
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then the infomediary will release the information. This type of privacy protection is 
informed primarily by the third privacy ideal – context and identity management.1 It 
presumes an autonomous individual agent with relatively fixed identity, yet it recognizes 
that certain information pertaining to that agent is sensitive in some contexts but not in 
others. By incorporating the ability to bargain for the right to access personal data, it also 
recognizes the fourth understanding of privacy issues – that is, the role of personal 
information as a valuable input into the construction of market relations.   
These systems have not been widely adopted by individual internet users for at least 
four reasons.  First, they are often operationally complex. PGP requires an infrastructure 
for distributing cryptographic keys which users are likely to find impenetrable (Whitten 
and Tygar, 1999). The cryptographic problem of establishing unlinkable, but persistent 
and viable pseudonyms through open Internet protocols is extraordinarily difficult. This 
functional complexity makes it difficult to design an interface which is anything but 
inscrutable, slow, and erratic. Second, and even presuming a robust and transparent 
interface, it is not at all clear what one is to do with numerous persona in online 
interactions.  The management of face and identity is second nature in face to face 
interactions. We do not usually, for example, present ourselves at work as we do at a 
college football game.  But these identity producing activities – modes of dress or speech 
– are more or less taken for granted and culturally commonplace.  Slippage between 
identities is almost unconscious.  In online identity management, the choice of identities 
                                                 
1 Indeed, Lumeria’s public relation’s material is quite explicit in this regard: 
“But, what is privacy? In the Internet age, the definition of privacy provided by Alan Westin in 
Privacy and Freedom seems most fitting:  ‘…the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to 
determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is  communicated to 
others.’ Whereas privacy issues used to apply to what Chief Justice Brandeis called ‘the right to be 
left alone,’ Lumeria believes that privacy is not about hiding from others, but rather about controlling 
the flow of your personal data.” (“What is Privacy?”) 
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is very much a conscious one.  But it is a decision made outside of familiar physical and 
social contexts.  It is not clear to the user just who is likely to be present in an online 
context, what the appropriate norms of behavior are, and what the consequences are for 
transgressing those norms. In short, it is not clear why or to what end one would choose 
one persona over another in any online context (Phillips, 2001).  Third, there is the 
problem of social and economic power. This is particularly an issue with infomediary 
systems, which are founded conceptually on the idea of a market negotiation for bits of 
personal data.  But in a market comprised of individuals in negotiation with corporations, 
individuals are likely to be contract takers.  This is particularly true in a market for 
personal information, where the marginal utility to the individual of one piece of data is 
small enough to make its defense economically unfeasible, while the organization has 
every economic reason and resource to protect and expand its data collection (Gandy 
1993a). Finally, the frames though which privacy issues are presented, both in policy 
debate and in the popular press, overwhelmingly privilege the understanding of privacy 
as a personal, rather than a social, value (Regan, 1995; Phillips and Curry, forthcoming).  
When the issue is framed as a balancing of the rights of the individual versus the needs of 
society, it is difficult to justify the social or personal effort to protect personal 
information.  
 
B-2-B PETS 
Although consumer adoption of individual-to-individual and consumer-to-business 
systems has been sparse, activist organizations have successfully pressed for the passage 
of privacy laws and regulations. At the same time, privacy entrepreneurs have attempted 
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to stimulate institutional adoption of PETs.  One of these attempts is Zero Knowledge 
System’s Enterprise Privacy Rights Management (PRM) Suite.  This suite is aimed at 
database holders, rather than consumers, and is designed to mediate the exchange of data 
both among large data holders and between individuals and data holders.  It is not fully 
deployed yet, so what follows is  a description of the apparent intent, rather than the 
implementation of this system. 
PRM is designed to allow companies to “tap their databases  ... without violating 
privacy laws” and to “create new offers to customers, without violating privacy.” (Riga, 
2001)  It enables “management of personal information in a manner that supports 
business objectives, customer preference and choice, and the global requirements of 
privacy regulations” through “the application of rules based on regulation, corporate 
policy, and/or customer preferences to personal information” (“The Privacy 
Challenge…”, “Privacy Rights Management ... ”).   
Note that the system is designed to incorporate regulation as a subset of its privacy 
structure, while also incorporating internal policy and consumer choice. However, 
compliance with policy is likely to be, not only the least common denominator, but the 
full extent of its protection.  This is, again, because individuals haven’t the wherewithal 
to knowledgeably adopt and use PETs, nor the market information or market power to 
strike self-benefiting contracts, nor the ideology to understand privacy as a social good, 
rather than an individual benefit.  
Before we can determine the likely implications of these systems, then, we must 
examine the regulations they are likely to mediate. 
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PRIVACY REGULATION AND IDENTIFICATION 
There are three major pieces of privacy legislation in the U.S.  These are the 
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), parts 160 and 164 of the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), and Sections 6801 through 6810 
of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLB).  All of these operationalize privacy concerns by 
restricting the collection, use, or transfer of “personally identifiable information”.  As we 
shall see, the operationalization of privacy in terms of a particular kind of identification 
practice has implications for the kinds of social relations facilitated by these regulatory 
regimes. 
What does it mean for information to be “personally identifiable”? “Identification,” 
like “privacy,” is an overloaded word.  In general, we may identify three different kinds 
of identification practice.  Lexical identification links a name to an entity. Anyone who 
has spent much time with horticulturalists has enjoyed this type of activity, as autumn 
walks become an opportunity to identify, in Latin, every rooted thing.  Indexical 
identification points to an entity.  Yelling “Stop! Thief!” is an act of indexical 
identification.  It is a link to a particular entity in a particular time and place.  Descriptive 
identification assigns attributes to an entity in a way that places it in relation to other 
entities.  To refer to someone as a typical disgruntled academic is descriptive 
identification (Agre, 1999).  
As with our types of privacy, these are not mutually exclusive identification 
practices.  Botanical names are both lexical and descriptive, and “unique identifiers” such 
as the social security number are lexical on their face, but deeply embedded in practices 
of indexical identification.  They help to track and find you. 
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Identification practices are also implicated in the type of privacy practices discussed 
earlier. Descriptive and lexical identification are used in the social processes of statistical 
production.  That is, it is essential in statistics to know the particular attributes of an 
entity.  It is also necessary to know whether or not an entity with the same attributes is 
the same entity, or another occurrence of the same type of entity.   Descriptive and lexical 
identification are implicated, then, in those parts of the surveillance process which create 
social norms and fields of knowledge.  Indexical identification, the actual pointing to or 
accessing of a particular bodily entity, is implicated in that part of the surveillance 
process which applies those produced norms to individuals. Because indexical 
identification is an element of panoptic normalization, it is part of the fourth privacy 
concern – social coordination.  Because it permits action upon a particular individual, it is 
cognitively linked to the first privacy concern – intrusion. 
The three laws mentioned above are concerned only with indexical identification, not 
with descriptive or lexical identification. That is, they consider within the realm of  
privacy protection only information potentially linked to an individual’s body, not 
information produced by an individual, pertaining to an individual, or describing an 
individual.2  
COPPA is most explicit in this regard.  It prohibits the collection or dissemination of 
personal information of children under the age of 13, and defines “personal information” 
to mean “individually identifiable information”, including names, addresses, telephone 
numbers or “any other identifier that ...  permits the physical or online contacting of a 
specific individual.”  The collection of other information, for example age, patterns of 
                                                 
2 I am not a lawyer, nor do I play one on TV. These are recent laws, and have not yet been subject to any 
interpretive rulings.  The discussion that follows is informed only by my own face-value reading of the 
texts. 
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web usage, or preferences in breakfast cereals, is prohibited only if it is combined with 
such an identifier. (15 USCS § 6501  (2001)) 
GLB, too, restricts the dissemination only of “nonpublic personal information”.  This 
is defined as “personally identifiable financial information” provided by a customer in 
any transaction with a financial institution. The restriction on dissemination includes “any 
list, description, or other grouping of consumers (and publicly available information 
pertaining to them) that is derived using any nonpublic personal information other than 
publicly available information.” (15 USC, Subchapter I, Sec. 6809 (4))   
HIPAA incorporates an extremely complex and protective set of rules regarding the 
dissemination of “identified information.” However, “de-identified information” is 
specifically excluded from the rules.  Records are considered de-identified if the 
following fields are removed: Names; geographic subdivisions smaller than a State, dates 
of birth, admission, discharge, treatment, or death (except for the year of such dates), 
telephone or fax numbers, social security numbers, e-mail addresses, URLs, IP addresses, 
medical record, health plan, and other account, license, serial, or other unique identifying 
numbers, and biometric identifiers (including facial photographs).  Importantly, however, 
a record holder may assign a code to a de-identified record in order to permit the original 
record holder to re-identify the record. (45 CFR 164.514(b)(2)(a), 45 CFR 164.514(c), 65 
Fed. Reg. at 82818)3 
In summary, these rules permit data holders to do anything they want with 
information derived from and produced by individuals, provided that they de-link the 
data from the individual’s indexical identity.  The actions of individuals may be used to 
describe and model them in any way the data holder wishes, provided the data holder 
                                                 
3 For a discussion of the problems inherent in de-identifying records, see Sweeney 1997. 
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cannot actually contact, locate, point to, or act upon the individual thus described.  They 
are, again, informed by an understanding of “privacy” that is closely related to the 
protection of the individual from unwanted intrusion. 
However, it is technically and administratively possible within this legal framework 
to produce profiles which can be shown to pertain to a specific, unique individual, and 
yet are “de-identified” in the sense that no one can point to any particular person and say 
“this is about him.”  That is, profiles can be identified lexically but not indexically.  This 
can be accomplished through one way hash functions.  A one way function is a function 
which relatively simple to compute, but extremely difficult to reverse.  A one-way hash 
function accepts a data string as input and produces as output a seemingly random data 
string, the hash value.  The same input will always produce the same hash value.  
However, while it is simple to compute the hash value of a data string, it is virtually 
impossible to compute the original data string given only its hash value.  (Schneier, 1996) 
Therefore, a data holder may code a record by computing a hash value from an 
identification field in the record, say the social security number, and attaching that hash 
value to the record.  The holder then removes all identifying fields from the record. There 
is now no way for the record holder to reverse the hash, recover the social security 
number, and re-identify the record. Legally, that record is not subject to any privacy 
regulation.  However, another data holder may de-identify their records using the same 
algorithm. If they use the same hash fields and functions, then the records pertaining to 
the same individual share the same hash value, while records pertaining to different 
individuals will have different hash values.  The records will be lexically and 
descriptively identified, but not indexically identified.  
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This technique, born of a particular understanding of “privacy” as articulated in 
regulation and mediated through computing power, has significant implications for the 
social ordering of identity and categories. 
 
SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS 
This potential new informational structure breaks the link, not between the different 
records created by the actions of a single individual, but between those records and the 
fleshly individual herself.  Philosophically and practically, these practices facilitate a 
world that consists of unary individuals (that is, unique individuals whose identity is  
constant across contexts), who are constituted as data objects by invisible and powerful 
observers.  Thus the part of the panoptic model that permits the production of knowledge, 
of disciplines and statistical norms remains intact. Data holders will still be in the 
powerful position of creating and imposing an ontology of the world.  Data produced by 
individuals will still be used to construct pricing schemes, risk management schemes, 
persuasive ads, and appropriate places.  Seen through the lens of the fourth vision of 
privacy, which concerns itself with the rationalization of population, this data protection 
scheme at first seems to offer  no protection at all. 
However, the ability for data holders and marketers to actually categorize and act 
upon people in light of these constructed orderings may be restricted.  That is, though 
marketers may be able to develop an ideal consumer and product developers may be able 
to fashion an ideal product for that person, they may yet be unable to tell whether, or to 
what extent, any particular individual fits that ideal.  Individuals may be more able to 
choose their presentation to fit their context. The third sense of privacy, identity 
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management, may be strengthened and the processes of surveillant social organization 
may be disrupted.  
Such a system also addresses the second sense of privacy – that of public 
participation in the definition of the public/private divide.  One of the most insidious 
aspects of market profiling is that the social models thus produced are private property.  
For example, the algorithms by which auto insurance companies determine the rate for 
each individual policy holder are trade secrets.  Although the individual has a right to 
know what data was used to calculate the rate, they will not be told how that rate was 
calculated, or what they may do to reduce the rate.  Not only are the models trade secrets, 
but marketers, aware of the public’s increasing concern for privacy, make specific public 
relations efforts to disguise the extent of their knowledge.  When this private social 
modeling is combined with the private persuasive techniques of targeted marketing, the 
result is an anti-democratic, anti-deliberative process of social shaping.  While the effects 
of mortgage and insurance redlining are enduring and evident, the effects of price 
discrimination through targeted marketing are socially invisible. Once the ability to target 
individuals for persuasive campaigns is reduced, these campaigns must again take place 
in the public sphere.  Therefore these laws and informational  systems also address the 
second privacy problem – the strategic maintenance of the public/private divide. 
It is important to recognize that these predictions are merely that.  The interactions 
among systems developers, laws, corporate data holders, activist organizations, news 
media, and individual data providers is extremely complex and  subject to the vagaries of 
each historical moment.  What I have laid out is merely one set of pressures, one pattern 
of mutual influence in an all but unfathomable set of social relations. 
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CONCLUSION AND RECOMENDATIONS 
In fashioning COPPA, HIPPA, and Gramm-Leach-Bliley, U.S. legislators have 
employed the cognitive frame of personal intrusion to understand privacy concerns. They 
have ignored other possible understandings, most obviously that of social coordination 
and control. They have structured a market for personal data such that the originator of 
the data, and the subject of the data, have rights over the data only in certain 
circumstances – that is, only when the data can be used to physically and individually 
affect the data subject. In doing so, they have laid the regulatory foundation for 
information systems which substantially leave intact the ability of large data holders to 
create systems of social knowledge and power.  They also, however, marginally limit 
their ability to impose those knowledge systems on the surveilled population. On the 
whole though, they constitute a re-entrenchment, though also a re-alignment, of 
surveillance power. 
Should legislators wish to create a more fundamentally equitable information regime, 
they should consider operationalizing data laws not in terms of information that identifies 
individuals, but instead information that is produced by or pertains to individuals, 
whether those individuals are identifiable or not.  For example, Canada’s Personal 
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) is a small step in this 
direction.  Although again referring only to ‘‘personal information,’’ the Act prohibits not 
only the transfer of that information, but its use as well. Prohibitions on “use” might well 
include the de-identifying of those records in preparation for their transfer.  More 
importantly though, activists should encourage legislators to see privacy issues outside of 
the frame of personal intrusion, and more through the frame of social organization.  Then 
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legislation might be founded on a moral right, rather than a property right or a privacy 
right, to the use of the traces of one’s life in structuring the world in which we all live. 
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